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ANTI-EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN PENNSYLVANIA: A 
WEAPON FOR DEVELOPERS, A LOSS FOR LOW-
INCOME PENNSYLVANIANS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, seven landowners proposed to develop several thousand units of 
apartments, townhouses, and mobile homes in Buckingham Township, an outer 
suburb of Philadelphia.1 The 1970 census indicated that Buckingham was home 
to only 5150 residents and 1609 housing units.2 The proposed housing would 
have increased the number of Buckingham’s housing units by over 500%.3 
Wealthy and bucolic, Buckingham was just beginning to feel the pressure of 
increased development and trying to preserve its agricultural heritage. At the 
time, Buckingham’s zoning allowed for only single-family homes on minimum lot 
sizes of one acre, which would clearly prohibit the proposed development.4 
The landowners challenged the zoning under Pennsylvania’s developing 
exclusionary zoning case law, arguing that the zoning unconstitutionally 
excluded multifamily housing and mobile homes.5 Buckingham agreed that its 
zoning ordinance was unconstitutional under the new law and was in the process 
of developing a new, comprehensive zoning plan for the township.6 Buckingham 
enacted new, non-exclusionary zoning in 1975 and rejected the landowners’ 
applications for a curative amendment, filed to “cure” the former defective 
zoning.7 The landowners sued the township and won; the court held that the new 
zoning was not applicable to the case because the curative amendment was filed 
before the zoning changes were advertised.8 The court urged the landowners and 
the township to negotiate.9 
Today, on these parcels of land sit over one thousand single-family homes 
with values between $400,000 to $750,000, almost three hundred luxury 
townhouses worth over $400,000 each, and a desirable mobile-home park with 
 
1. Schlanger v. Buckingham Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 280, 281 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1976).  
2. Bucks County Planning Commission, 1970 Census Information (on file with author).  
3. See Schlanger, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 285 (approving developers’ curative amendment); 
Bucks County Planning Commission, supra note 2 (providing housing unit numbers as of 1970).  
4. Schlanger, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 281. 
5. See Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 397 (Pa. 1970) (holding that township’s zoning, which did 
not provide for multifamily housing, was unconstitutional). For an explanation of the development of 
exclusionary zoning case law in Pennsylvania, see infra Part II.C. 
6. Schlanger, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 281-82. 
7. Id. at 282. 
8. Id. at 283-84. The commonwealth court affirmed. Bd. of Supervisors of Buckingham Twp. v. 
Barness, 382 A.2d 140, 142 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). 
9. Schlanger, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 285. 
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monthly land rental costs of $400 and home values of approximately $200,000.10 
Buckingham Township indeed heeded the suggestion of the court to negotiate 
and in doing so avoided most of the 8155 new households that would have 
resided in the proposed multifamily housing and mobile-home park.11 In 
Pennsylvania, a developer who successfully challenges exclusionary zoning is not 
required to build the housing type for which he sued, and the developer and 
municipality may negotiate for a more mutually desirable development.12 In 
Buckingham, the lawsuit, ostensibly to build housing for low- to moderate-
income residents, resulted in expensive single-family homes, luxury townhouses, 
and an exclusive mobile-home community. This result hardly seems like a victory 
for affordable housing advocates. 
This Comment argues that the great need for affordable housing is not 
being met under Pennsylvania’s unique anti-exclusionary zoning case law 
because the law focuses on property rights and land uses rather than classes of 
people and because developers manipulate the curative amendment process. 
Part II provides an overview of the intertwined affordable housing and 
exclusionary zoning problems, an explanation of various state approaches to 
exclusionary zoning, a description of the Pennsylvania case law, and a discussion 
of the “sue and switch” tactic used by developers in the Buckingham example 
above. Part III.A discusses the financial and planning burdens placed on 
municipalities by the misuse of curative amendments. Part III.B criticizes the fact 
that affordable housing has not effectively resulted from this process. Part III.C 
suggests that anti-exclusionary zoning efforts would be more successful in 
Pennsylvania if they focused on creating housing for a variety of classes of 
people rather than ensuring a variety of land uses. Finally, Part III.D provides 
several suggestions for change, including an end to the doctrine of definitive 
relief, promotion of inclusionary zoning practices, and the pursuit of smart 
growth policies to rein in sprawl and make both the cities and the suburbs more 
desirable and affordable places to live. 
II. OVERVIEW 
Exclusionary zoning is widely considered to be a significant impediment to 
the development of affordable housing.13 States have taken a variety of 
approaches to combat exclusionary zoning, both in the courts and the 
legislatures.14 The most well-known example of judicial action against 
exclusionary zoning is found in New Jersey, where the Mt. Laurel doctrine15 
 
10. Buckingham Township, Table on Barness Cures (Nov. 2006) (on file with author).  
11. Id. 
12. See, e.g., Schlanger, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 285 (encouraging township and landowners to 
negotiate to “resolv[e] their differences”). 
13. See infra Part II.A for a definition of exclusionary zoning and its relationship to affordable 
housing as well as a general discussion of zoning authority in Pennsylvania.  
14. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of state efforts against exclusionary zoning. 
15. See generally S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel I), 336 
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) (establishing Mt. Laurel doctrine). See infra Part II.B.1 for an explanation of the 
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requires all municipalities to affirmatively provide for affordable housing.16 In 
Pennsylvania, the state supreme court has developed the “fair share” doctrine 
under the state constitution, requiring municipalities to allow a fair share of 
housing types.17 Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that 
municipalities must provide for a variety of uses, not a variety of classes of 
people, because the fair-share doctrine is based on constitutional property rights 
rather than a large-scale social justice program such as New Jersey’s.18  
To challenge zoning as exclusionary, a landowner may file a curative 
amendment application, requesting that the municipality “cure” the zoning’s 
alleged constitutional infirmity and allow a certain use of the land.19 If the 
municipality denies the application and the landowner wins a lawsuit in state 
court, the doctrine of definitive relief allows the court to order the requested 
zoning change, and the landowner may build on the property subject only to 
applicable building codes and other administrative requirements.20 Upon a 
successful challenge, a developer is not required to build the housing type for 
which he sued and may instead negotiate with the municipality to build a use 
that was prohibited under the zoning but not otherwise excluded from the 
township (for example, large single-family homes on small lots).21 This approach 
has been labeled “sue and switch.”22 
A. Exclusionary Zoning 
The need for affordable housing in America has been well documented.23 
Over twelve million households use more than fifty percent of their income to 
pay for housing, while the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(“HUD”) definition of affordability is for a household to pay only thirty percent 
or less of its income on housing.24 Thirty percent of Americans have difficulty 
affording their housing.25 Rental costs have risen faster than the consumer price 
 
Mt. Laurel doctrine.  
16. Id. at 724.  
17. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 108-09 (Pa. 1977). See infra Part II.C for a 
discussion of exclusionary zoning case law in Pennsylvania and a description of the fair-share doctrine. 
18. BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993). 
19. See infra Part II.D for a description of the curative amendment process. 
20. See infra Part II.E for an explanation of the doctrine of definitive relief. 
21. See infra Part II.F for a discussion of how the curative amendment process can be used by 
developers to build luxury rather than affordable housing. 
22. See infra Part II.F.1 for a discussion of the “sue and switch” tactic employed by developers.  
23. See, e.g., Douglas R. Porter, The Promise and Practice of Inclusionary Zoning, in GROWTH 
MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING: DO THEY CONFLICT? 212, 213 (Anthony Downs ed., 
2004) (discussing fact that “the supply of housing affordable to many Americans has not kept up with 
needs” and advocating inclusionary zoning as solution to affordable housing problem). 
24. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Affordable Housing, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 1, 2008). HUD has 
established that “[f]amilies who pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing are considered 
cost burdened and may have difficulty affording necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and 
medical care.” Id. 
25. Mandara Meyers, Comment, (Un)equal Protection for the Poor: Exclusionary Zoning and the 
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index since 1997.26 It is difficult to overstate the importance of stable and 
adequate housing in an individual’s life.27 Housing closely correlates to 
employment prospects, educational opportunities, and access to health care.28 
Cities and their suburbs are inherently interconnected, and a lack of affordable 
housing in one leads to extensive problems in the other.29 In Pennsylvania, 
population increases in the outer suburbs led to the creation of approximately 
269,000 new homes in the 1990s, while population decreases in the cities led to 
the loss of over 22,000 housing units during the same period.30 Because poor 
Pennsylvanians are significantly more likely to live in the cities and older 
suburbs, this population shift and the resulting housing changes 
disproportionately affect the poor.31 
Exclusionary zoning can be a barrier to the creation of affordable housing.32 
Zoning labeled as exclusionary often prescribes limits on types of housing, 
minimum lot sizes, restrictions on the number of occupants, and required 
setbacks.33 Such restrictions generally increase housing costs, which then make 
the housing unaffordable to low- and moderate-income individuals.34 
 
Need for Stricter Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 349, 355 (2003) (citing JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 25 (2003)); see also NAT’L LOW INCOME 
HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2006, at 2-3 (2006), available at http://www.nlihc.org/oor/ 
oor2006/introduction.pdf (comparing wages and rents in communities nationally to derive a “Housing 
Wage,” finding that average worker must earn $16.31 an hour to afford two-bedroom rental, and 
noting that federal minimum wage was $5.15 in 2006). 
26. Porter, supra note 23, at 213. 
27. See Justin D. Cummins, Comment, Recasting Fair Share: Toward Effective Housing Law and 
Principled Social Policy, 14 LAW & INEQ. 339, 342-51 (1996) (discussing “geography of opportunity,” 
meaning centrality of housing to important social opportunities, such as employment, education, and 
health care). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 359-60 (arguing that health of city will always be critical to health of its suburbs because 
of tourism, sustainable economic growth, spillover of poor conditions, and regional financial burden); 
see also Edward G. Goetz et al., The Minnesota Land Use Planning Act and the Promotion of Low- 
and Moderate-Income Housing in Suburbia, 22 LAW & INEQ. 31, 33 (2004) (stating that suburban 
barriers to affordable housing generate urban sprawl and trap poorer individuals in cities, away from 
suburban resources including superior jobs and schools). 
30. THE BROOKINGS INST., BACK TO PROSPERITY: A COMPETITIVE AGENDA FOR RENEWING 
PENNSYLVANIA 34 (2003), available at http://www.brook.edu/metro/publications/pa.htm. Population 
shifts, development trends, and zoning impediments are only some of the factors contributing to the 
shortage of affordable housing. For further information on the affordable housing crisis in 
Philadelphia, see generally AMY E. HILLIER & DENNIS P. CULHANE, UNIV. OF PA., CLOSING THE GAP: 
HOUSING (UN)AFFORDABILITY IN PHILADELPHIA (2003), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=cplan_papers; Housing Alliance of Pennsylvania, 
http://www.housingalliancepa.org (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).  
31. THE BROOKINGS INST., supra note 30, at 9-11.  
32. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Land Use and Housing Policies to Reduce Concentrated Poverty and 
Racial Segregation, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 877, 888 (2006) (arguing that exclusionary zoning is most 
common legal impediment to creation of affordable housing). 
33. Meyers, supra note 25, at 354 (citing Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches 
to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 309 (2002)). 
34. Id. 
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Exclusionary zoning has historically been linked to racial and class segregation 
and discriminatory motives by zoning authorities.35 
Municipalities are entitled to enact zoning ordinances under their police 
powers,36 though to be constitutional, the zoning must not be arbitrary or 
unreasonable and must bear a “substantial relation to the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare.”37 Ordinances are presumed to be valid unless shown 
to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not substantially related to the municipality’s 
police powers.38 The challenging party bears the burden of proving the 
ordinance’s unconstitutionality.39 Nevertheless, where a legitimate use is 
completely prohibited, the burden shifts to the municipality to justify the 
ordinance on grounds of public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.40 On 
appeal, the reviewing court has statutory authority to invalidate any ordinance.41 
Municipalities have primary land-use authority in Pennsylvania, as 
delegated to them by the state legislature in the Municipalities Planning Code 
(“MPC”).42 The MPC was enacted in 1968 and is a consolidation of all planning 
and zoning requirements for local governments with which municipalities must 
comply.43 The MPC specifies for which purposes municipalities may zone, 
including to protect the public welfare, preserve natural and historic values, 
prevent overcrowding and blight, preserve agricultural lands, provide for all 
 
35. Lisa C. Young, Comment, Breaking the Color Line: Zoning and Opportunity in America’s 
Metropolitan Areas, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 667, 668-72 (2005) (describing zoning that was 
historically enacted with discriminatory purpose and arguing that, because minorities are 
disproportionately poor, exclusionary zoning can cause racial segregation today). 
36. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). In Euclid, the Court upheld 
a zoning restriction banning apartment buildings from areas of single-family homes, finding that 
apartment buildings are often a “mere parasite” of the pleasant community and expressing concern for 
the safety and welfare of children living in single-family homes. Id. at 394. For a discussion of the 
exclusionary tone of Euclid, see Young, supra note 35, at 673-74. 
37. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (recognizing constitutional source of zoning powers); C&M 
Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143, 154 (Pa. 2002); Nat’l Land & 
Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (Pa. 1965). 
38. C&M Developers, Inc., 820 A.2d at 154. 
39. BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993) (citing Nat’l Land, 215 A.2d at 
607). 
40. Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 1985). This burden does not shift to the 
municipality if the zoning is allegedly exclusionary due to minimum lot-size requirements rather than 
total prohibition of a certain use (e.g., prohibition of apartment buildings). See C&M Developers, Inc., 
820 A.2d at 154 (finding that protection of property rights does not require that this burden shift, and 
holding that municipalities need not establish “extraordinary justification” for minimum lot-size 
requirements). 
41. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11006-A(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). 
42. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10601 (West 1997) (“The governing body of each municipality, in 
accordance with the conditions and procedures set forth in this act, may enact, amend and repeal 
zoning ordinances to implement comprehensive plans and to accomplish any of the purposes of this 
act.”).  
43. Joel P. Dennison, Comment, New Tricks for an Old Dog: The Changing Role of the 
Comprehensive Plan Under Pennsylvania’s “Growing Smarter” Land Use Reforms, 105 DICK. L. REV. 
385, 399 (2001) (citing Robert S. Ryan, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.1.1 (1992)).  
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basic forms of housing, and accommodate reasonable community growth.44 
Today, however, zoning that some may label as “exclusionary” may be 
designed to have beneficial effects on the community, such as protecting public 
safety, preventing overcrowding, and ensuring adequate public services and 
facilities.45 For example, municipalities may enact zoning to control sprawl.46 The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has defined sprawl as “development that is 
inefficient in its use of land (i.e. low density); constructed in a ‘leap frog’ manner 
in areas without existing infrastructure, often on prime farmland; automobile 
dependent, and consisting of isolated single use neighborhoods requiring 
excessive transportation.”47 Sprawl is a national phenomenon; in the year 2000 
alone, three million acres of land were developed into urban and suburban use.48 
In Pennsylvania, the rate of sprawl has increased tremendously over the past two 
decades.49 Between 1982 and 1997, 1.14 million acres of land were developed, 
accounting for one-third of all development in Pennsylvania’s history and 
averaging almost four acres of newly developed land per resident.50 
The costs of sprawl include lost farmland, damaged environmental 
resources, and land inefficiency.51 In Pennsylvania, the trend is particularly 
pronounced. During the 1990s, Pennsylvania saw the construction of 546,000 new 
homes while the state added only 281,000 new households, and almost three-
quarters of this development occurred in the outer suburbs.52 Despite the new 
residential and commercial construction in the outer suburbs, minorities and the 
poor remain concentrated in Pennsylvania’s cities, creating some of the most 
segregated areas in the United States.53 The movement of jobs into the outer 
suburbs without a corresponding rise in affordable suburban housing isolates 
low-income workers from job opportunities.54 The decentralization that sprawl 
brings and continuing urban decline are closely related problems.55 
 
44. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10604 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). For the text of this provision and the 
commonwealth court’s interpretation of its meaning within the affordable housing context, see infra 
notes 154-59 and accompanying text. 
45. Henry A. Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1, 10 (2001). 
46. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found restrictions on “type, design, location, and 
intensity” of housing to be reasonable when related to a municipality’s efforts to control sprawl. In re 
Petition of Dolington Land Group, 839 A.2d 1021, 1032 (Pa. 2003). 
47. Id. at 1028 n.8. 
48. Dennison, supra note 43, at 388. 
49. THE BROOKINGS INST., supra note 30, at 47.  
50. Id. at 47. 
51. Id. at 47-48. 
52. Id. at 33-34. 
53. Id. at 36. While the population of the outer suburbs increased by twelve percent in the last 
decade, the urban and older suburban population declined by two percent. THE BROOKINGS INST., 
supra note 30, at 28.  
54. Id. at 61. 
55. Id. at 56; see also Orfield, supra note 32, at 877 (arguing that sprawl increases urban racial 
segregation as white urban residents move from city or inner suburbs to newly built housing in outer 
suburbs). 
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Growth management describes policies that plan for future growth and 
“seek[] to accommodate growth sensibly, not to limit or prevent it.”56 Similarly, 
the smart-growth movement advocates higher-density development 
concentrated around public transit and other infrastructure to contain 
development and restrict sprawl.57 While growth management has historically 
been linked to discriminatory policies that restricted the availability of 
affordable housing,58 there is now substantial evidence that growth management 
and affordable housing need not be mutually exclusive.59 In fact, some scholars 
have proposed that the only politically viable alternative to exclusionary zoning 
is growth management, because dissatisfied citizens will urge local officials to 
take action against the overdevelopment and congestion that are characteristic 
of today’s suburbs.60 Affordable housing can be an important component of a 
growth-management plan.61 
B. State Efforts Against Exclusionary Zoning 
Though the U.S. Supreme Court has held that there is no federal 
constitutional right to affordable housing,62 state courts and legislatures have 
taken a variety of approaches to attempt to generate affordable housing and 
combat exclusionary zoning. Pennsylvania is one of the few states in which the 
judiciary has actively dealt with exclusionary zoning, and Pennsylvania is 
 
56. Anthony Downs, Introduction to GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 
supra note 23, at 1, 3.  
57. James A. Kushner, Smart Growth, New Urbanism and Diversity: Progressive Planning 
Movements in America and Their Impact on Poor and Minority Ethnic Populations, 21 UCLA J. 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 45, 49 (2002-2003). 
58. See Richard P. Voith & David L. Crawford, Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, in 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 23, at 82, 87 (suggesting that 
“zoning restrictions and other local regulations have been used historically to systematically exclude 
certain racial or economic groups”).  
59. See Arthur C. Nelson et al., The Link Between Growth Management and Housing 
Affordability: The Academic Evidence, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, 
supra note 23, at 117, 158 (reviewing literature on effect of growth-management policies and housing 
affordability, and concluding that successful growth-management policies include expanded affordable 
housing options for low-income families). 
60. Id. at 156. 
61. See Daniel Carlson & Shishir Mathur, Does Growth Management Aid or Thwart the 
Provision of Affordable Housing?, in GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra 
note 23, at 20, 24, 62-63 (pointing to several states in which affordable housing is part of growth-
management laws); see also Jonathan D. Weiss, Preface: Smart Growth and Affordable Housing, 12 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 165, 169 (2003) (noting that sprawl can decrease 
availability of affordable housing).  
62. Catherine Durkin, Comment, The Exclusionary Effect of “Mansionization”: Area Variances 
Undermine Efforts to Achieve Housing Affordability, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 439, 444-45 (2006) (citing 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)). In Lindsey, the Court held that there was no constitutional 
guarantee of housing of a certain quality and stated that “[w]e do not denigrate the importance of 
decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every 
social and economic ill.” 405 U.S. at 74. For a discussion of the constitutional issues surrounding 
exclusionary zoning, see generally Meyers, supra note 25. 
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considered to have some of the most developed case law on the subject in the 
country.63 The Pennsylvania courts have battled exclusionary zoning on the basis 
of property uses, however, rather than on the basis of the affordability of 
housing.64 This approach contrasts sharply with New Jersey’s social-justice-
oriented Mt. Laurel doctrine, which requires that each municipality provide for 
its fair share of affordable housing.65 The judiciaries and legislatures of other 
states, including California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington, have 
also taken a variety of approaches to combating exclusionary zoning.66 
1. New Jersey and Mt. Laurel 
In its 1975 landmark decision of Southern Burlington County NAACP v. 
Township of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel I),67 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
invalidated a zoning ordinance that excluded almost all low- and moderate-
income individuals by providing for only single-family detached housing with 
restrictive minimum lot-size and building-size requirements.68 Based on due 
process rights under the state constitution, the court held that such zoning was 
contrary to the general welfare and that the township could not justify the zoning 
based on limiting the number of children in public schools or for environmental 
reasons.69 Establishing the “fair share” requirement with which New Jersey 
would struggle for decades, the court held: 
 We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use 
regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate 
variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it 
cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people mentioned for 
low and moderate income housing and in its regulations must 
affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least to the extent of the 
municipality’s fair share of the present and prospective regional need 
therefor. These obligations must be met unless the particular 
municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating peculiar 
circumstances which dictate that it should not be required so to do.70 
Eight years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding 
 
63. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Lehmann, Reversing Judicial Deference Toward Exclusionary Zoning: A 
Suggested Approach, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 229, 240 (2003) (suggesting 
that Pennsylvania has “the most clearly articulated tests to prevent exclusionary zoning”). 
64. See, e.g., BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993) (noting proper 
exclusionary zoning analysis focuses on uses of property). 
65. See infra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of New Jersey’s Mt. Laurel doctrine. See also James L. 
Mitchell, Will Empowering Developers to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning Increase Suburban Housing 
Choice? 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 119, 131 (2004) (comparing effectiveness of affordable 
housing creation in Pennsylvania and New Jersey). 
66. See infra Parts II.B.2-3 for a discussion of the variety of approaches states have taken to 
eliminating exclusionary zoning. 
67. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
68. For a thorough discussion of the Mt. Laurel decisions, see Span, supra note 45, at 48-72. 
69. Mt. Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 730-31. 
70. Id. at 724-25. 
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and provided more specific guidance for implementation of this broad policy 
goal in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mt. 
Laurel II).71 In response, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Fair Housing 
Act of 1985,72 which required every municipality to adopt a housing plan to meet 
the fair-share requirement and created a statewide Council on Affordable 
Housing to develop policy and review municipal housing plans.73 
The Mt. Laurel decisions and resulting legislation generated significant 
scholarly debate, though little empirical research has been conducted to 
determine the effectiveness of New Jersey’s attempt to generate affordable 
housing.74 Though judicial and legislative efforts have produced a considerable 
amount of less expensive housing, some have noted that those occupying such 
housing “tend to be of relatively high socioeconomic status but at a low point in 
their lifetime earning potential,” such as students, divorced individuals, and the 
retired.75  
2. In the Courts 
Only a handful of state courts besides New Jersey and Pennsylvania have 
invalidated zoning because it is exclusionary.76 States including Massachusetts, 
Virginia, and Michigan have struck down certain minimum lot-size requirements 
but have not “stated a legal rule that will consistently result in invalidation.”77 
Courts in other states, including New Hampshire, New York, and Illinois, have 
found zoning restrictions on multifamily housing to be unreasonable for a variety 
of reasons, including economic infeasibility of development, unreasonable 
municipal action exceeding the police power, and inadequate accommodation of 
regional housing needs.78 
3. In the Legislatures 
State legislatures have taken a variety of approaches in an effort to increase 
the availability of affordable housing.79 State-override statutes permit state 
 
71. 456 A.2d 390, 418-59 (N.J. 1983) (describing procedure for lower courts to review municipal 
ordinances to ensure adequate opportunities for affordable housing development). 
72. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301 to -329 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).  
73. Naomi Bailin Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, The Impact of Mount Laurel Initiatives: An Analysis 
of the Characteristics of Applicants and Occupants, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1268, 1271 (1997). 
74. Id. at 1273, 1301-05 (discussing scholars’ interest in New Jersey’s anti-exclusionary zoning 
program, and detailing their studies’ findings that program has generated some low- to moderate-
income housing but that goals of allowing low-income families, especially minorities, to move from 
urban to suburban housing have not been accomplished). 
75. Span, supra note 45, at 68; see also Cummins, supra note 27, at 371 (arguing that legislation 
primarily benefits marginal middle-income or temporarily low-income whites and has largely ignored 
minority groups and genuinely low-income individuals). 
76. Lehmann, supra note 63, at 240. 
77. Id. at 242-43 (discussing case law and legal rules applied in these state courts). 
78. Id. at 245-47. 
79. For a thorough discussion of state legislative action against exclusionary zoning, see 
Lehmann, supra note 63, at 235-40. 
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governments to review local zoning to determine if it excludes affordable 
housing uses.80 This process generally favors the developer and is known as a 
“builders’ remed[y].”81 Other state and local governments have passed 
inclusionary zoning statutes and ordinances, providing financial or other 
incentives to developers to build affordable housing.82 Fair-share legislation 
requires local governments to provide for a certain proportion of affordable 
housing based on a number of factors, including existing availability and 
projected future need.83 Other states require comprehensive community plans to 
include affordable housing.84 Nevertheless, some have argued that these 
legislative efforts have not generated much truly affordable housing.85 
Though Pennsylvania passed the Affordable Housing Act86 in 1992, it does 
not place any restrictions or affirmative duties on municipalities.87 The Act 
merely established the Pennsylvania Housing Advisory Committee, which is 
required to report on various statewide housing needs and policies.88 
C. Fair Share in Pennsylvania 
In Pennsylvania, municipalities are not permitted to completely exclude 
multifamily housing89 and must provide for their “fair share” of various housing 
 
80. Goetz et al., supra note 29, at 35. 
81. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 
497-98 (N.H. 1991)) (describing state-override statutes as requiring developer’s initiative to challenge 
local zoning decisions).  
82. Id. at 36. For example, the New Jersey Fair Housing Act requires inclusionary zoning 
techniques, such as rewarding developers who build affordable housing with increases in the permitted 
density of the property, tax abatements, infrastructure improvements, donations of municipal land, 
and public financial support. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-311 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); Cummins, 
supra note 27, at 364-65. For a discussion of inclusionary zoning practices, see generally Porter, supra 
note 23; Barbara Ehrlich Kautz, Comment, In Defense of Inclusionary Zoning: Successfully Creating 
Affordable Housing, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 971, 981 (2002); Brian R. Lerman, Note, Mandatory 
Inclusionary Zoning—The Answer to the Affordable Housing Problem, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
383, 385 (2006); Jennifer M. Morgan, Comment, Zoning for All: Using Inclusionary Zoning 
Techniques to Promote Affordable Housing, 44 EMORY L.J. 359, 369 (1995). For further discussion of 
inclusionary zoning practices, see infra Part III.D.2. 
83. Goetz et al., supra note 29, at 37-38. 
84. Id. at 38. 
85. See Cummins, supra note 27, at 370 (“Despite their tremendous potential, Fair Share policies 
continue to have only limited effectiveness.”). See generally Ben Field, Why Our Fair Share Housing 
Laws Fail, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 35, 38-68 (1993) (examining California’s fair-share housing laws, 
and finding that noncompliance and lack of enforcement have contributed to statutes’ lack of 
effectiveness).  
86. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1691.1-1691.6 (West 2003).  
87. See Precision Equities, Inc. v. Franklin Park Borough Zoning Hearing Bd., 646 A.2d 756, 761 
n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (finding that Act does not place duty on municipalities to provide their fair 
share of affordable housing). 
88. 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1691.5. 
89. Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585, 586 (Pa. 1985); Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 
398 (Pa. 1970). 
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types.90 Though this requirement is based on due process rights under the state 
constitution91 rather than judicially mandated affordable housing, early decisions 
concerned municipalities restricting growth in order to exclude “newcomers.”92 
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that the fair-share 
test applies only to uses of property, rather than classes of people able to afford 
the housing.93 Therefore, when evaluating whether a municipality has provided 
its fair share of various housing types, Pennsylvania courts do not consider the 
affordability of the housing.94 
1. Exclusion of Newcomers and Provision for Growth 
In the earliest cases to deal with exclusionary zoning, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court denounced and invalidated zoning that apparently had been 
designed to restrict growth and maintain the character of the community.95 
Instead, the court found that municipalities have an affirmative duty to allow for 
growth within their borders.96 In National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn,97 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held Easttown Township’s four-acre minimum lot-
size requirement to be unconstitutional in light of expanding populations and 
resulting demand for housing in the Philadelphia suburb.98 Specifically, the court 
found that, while zoning is an important tool, it must not be used by municipal 
officials to “shirk their responsibilities” when faced with “the increased 
responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably 
bring.”99 
The court found that the township’s proffered justification of maintaining 
open space and preserving the character of its community appeared to be based 
in part on concerns that old, large homes would become neighbors to small, 
inexpensive homes, which the court classified as an exclusionary attempt that 
would not promote general welfare.100 The court concluded that “[a] zoning 
ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in 
order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration 
 
90. Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 110 (Pa. 1977); Twp. of Willistown v. 
Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 468 (Pa. 1975). 
91. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 107-08. 
92. Girsh, 263 A.2d at 398-99; Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (Pa. 1965). 
93. BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993). 
94. See id. (relying on land use rather than affordability of housing in evaluation).  
95. See Girsh, 263 A.2d at 398 (finding it “unacceptable” for municipality to effectively choose to 
freeze population growth through zoning ordinances); Nat’l Land, 215 A.2d at 610-13 (rejecting 
argument for rezoning to preserve community “character” because that goal could be achieved in ways 
other than excluding multifamily housing).  
96. See Girsh, 263 A.2d at 398-99 (finding it to be municipality’s duty to provide for future 
population growth); Nat’l Land, 215 A.2d at 610 (providing that municipalities should not utilize 
zoning in order to evade obligations).  
97. 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965). 
98. Nat’l Land, 215 A.2d at 610-13. 
99. Id. at 610. 
100. Id. at 612. 
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of public services and facilities can not be held valid.”101 
In Appeal of Girsh,102 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied National 
Land to invalidate a zoning ordinance that failed to provide for multifamily 
housing, although such use was not expressly prohibited by the zoning.103 The 
court held that the lack of zoning for apartments excluded people who would be 
able to live in the community if the apartments were built.104 Importantly, the 
developer in Girsh was seeking to build luxury apartments, and the court did not 
consider the affordability of these units to low-income individuals once built.105 
The court reaffirmed National Land and held that the township must “bear its 
rightful part of the burden” associated with population growth in spite of the 
township’s concerns about the strain the apartment complex would place on its 
municipal services and roads, as well as the changing character of the 
community.106 
In Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.,107 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court expanded on the principles in National Land and Girsh to find 
that zoning for apartments in only eighty acres of a township of 11,589 acres is 
“tokenism” and therefore exclusionary.108 The court found that the 
constitutional prohibition on preventing newcomers from living within a 
township “is not limited to total exclusion, but also selective admission.”109 
Citing New Jersey’s landmark Mt. Laurel I decision, the court held that the 
zoning ordinance at issue was unconstitutionally exclusionary because it did not 
provide for a “fair share” of township acreage for multifamily housing.110 In 
response, the dissent argued that the plurality failed to define “fair share” or 
explain why Willistown, a rural community of only 9128 residents, failed to 
satisfy the test.111 
2. Surrick’s Fair-Share Test 
In the principal case of Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board,112 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance in which only 
1.14% of the township’s total acreage was zoned in a district that permitted 
 
101. Id. For a discussion of how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has abandoned this line of 
reasoning relating to people rather than uses, see infra Part II.C.4. 
102. 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970). 
103. Girsh, 263 A.2d at 396, 398.  
104. Id. at 397. 
105. Id. at 396. The court seemed aware, however, of the connotation apartments have to some 
individuals, noting that “[i]t should be pointed out that much of the opposition to apartment uses in 
suburban communities is based on fictitious emotional appeals which insist on categorizing all 
apartments as being equivalent to the worst big-city tenements.” Id. at 399 n.5. 
106. Id. at 398-99. 
107. 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975). 
108. Willistown, 341 A.2d at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109. Id. at 468. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 469-70 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). 
112. 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977). 
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apartments.113 For the first time, the court clearly stated that it was employing a 
substantive due process analysis in the preceding line of cases to find zoning to 
be exclusionary when it did not bear a substantial relationship to public 
welfare.114 The court emphasized the individual right to enjoy private property 
under the Pennsylvania Constitution115 and the due process rights of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, which require 
reasonable use of the state police power.116  
Surrick established a tripartite test to determine the constitutionality of 
zoning ordinances alleged to be exclusionary in order to ascertain whether 
communities provided their “fair share” of housing.117 The first prong of the test 
requires examining “whether the community in question is a logical area for 
development and population growth” like the communities in National Land and 
Girsh.118 Factors involved in this analysis include projected population growth 
and the location of the community.119 The second prong of Surrick’s test 
analyzes the current level of development within the community, including the 
use of population data, percentage of undeveloped land, and the percentage of 
land available for multifamily housing.120 
Upon finding that the community is in the path of development and not 
already highly developed, the court must finally examine whether the zoning has 
an exclusionary effect.121 The Surrick court emphasized that the relevant inquiry 
focuses on effect rather than purpose; exclusionary intent is unnecessary to 
demonstrate that an ordinance is unconstitutionally exclusionary.122 The court 
must also consider the extent of the exclusion, including the percentage of 
available land for multifamily housing in light of population growth and the total 
percentage of available land.123 
Here, the court noted for the first time that past decisions invalidating 
exclusionary zoning have been on the basis of exclusion of uses rather than 
 
113. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 106-07. 
114. Id. at 108. 
115. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (“All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain 
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.”). 
116. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 108; Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 397 n.3 (Pa. 1970). 
117. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 110-11. 
118. Id. at 110. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 110-11. When it is alleged that zoning violates the Equal Protection 
Clause because of discriminatory race- or class-based zoning, a different analysis applies. See Village 
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1977) (noting that judicial 
deference cannot be justified when discriminatory purpose is “motivating factor” in decision).  
123. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 111. Applying this test, the court found that the township was in a 
logical area for growth as a Philadelphia suburb and was not so developed as to preclude multifamily 
housing. Finding the provision of only 1.14% of the township’s land for apartments to be a partial 
exclusion of multifamily dwellings, the court held that the township had not provided its “fair share” 
of multifamily housing. Id. at 111-12. 
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exclusion of certain classes of people.124 Just two pages earlier in the opinion, 
however, the court found that the fair-share principle requires municipalities to 
“meet the legitimate needs of all categories of people who may desire to live 
within its boundaries.”125 There, the court noted the citation to Mt. Laurel I in 
Willistown as the inspiration for Pennsylvania’s fair-share test, though the court 
stated that “[w]e are not bound by New Jersey’s purported ‘vast expansion of 
zoning principles.’”126  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court later clarified in Fernley v. Board of 
Supervisors127 that the fair-share test only applies to partial (de facto), rather 
than total (de jure), exclusions of multifamily housing.128 An ordinance totally 
excluding multifamily housing is unconstitutional unless the municipality can 
demonstrate that the exclusion promotes public health, safety, morals, and 
general welfare.129 Otherwise, areas not in the path of growth (and therefore not 
required to provide a fair share of various types of housing) could completely 
exclude multifamily housing.130 The court noted that population growth is not 
necessarily correlated to housing demand.131 That is, families who wish to live in 
Schuylkill Township but who cannot afford to do so because of the lack of 
multifamily housing are excluded even if there is no independent population 
pressure on the township.132 
3. Categories of Multifamily Housing 
The Surrick fair-share test does not require the provision of “every 
conceivable use” or even different categories of multifamily housing.133 In the 
companion cases of In re Appeal of Elocin, Inc.134 and In re Appeal of M.A. 
Kravitz Co.,135 developers challenged zoning as exclusionary where provisions 
for townhouses were not made, though the townships allowed other forms of 
multifamily housing.136 Both challenges failed.137 The court held that “[w]e have 
 
124. Id. at 110 n.10. 
125. Id. at 108 (emphasis added). 
126. Id. at 109 n.8. Justice Roberts, concurring, disliked the fair-share standard, finding that the 
reasoning had never commanded a majority, but stated that he would still invalidate the ordinance as 
unreasonable. Justice Roberts highlighted the difficulty New Jersey has had in formulating and 
implementing its fair-share standard and argued that courts are not well positioned to deal with the 
complicated issues involved. He concluded: “We would do well to continue to steer clear of ‘fair 
share.’” Surrick, 382 A.2d at 114-15 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
127. 502 A.2d 585 (Pa. 1985). 
128. Fernley, 502 A.2d at 586-88 (holding unconstitutional ordinance which totally prohibited 
multifamily housing because township failed to assert legitimate public purpose for exclusion).  
129. Id. at 587. 
130. See id. at 588 (rejecting argument that township’s zoning ordinance was not exclusionary 
because there was little probability of community growth).  
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. In re Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 461 A.2d 771, 773 (Pa. 1983). 
134. 461 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1983). 
135. 460 A.2d 1075 (Pa. 1983). 
136. Elocin, 461 A.2d at 772; Kravitz, 460 A.2d at 1077.  
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never found an ordinance unreasonable solely because it fails to provide for a 
particular use.”138 
Nevertheless, dissents in both cases argued that townhouses serve different 
housing needs than do apartments or other forms of multifamily housing, and 
different designs should therefore be considered separately under the fair-share 
analysis.139 The Kravitz dissent argued that townhouses are “a legitimate 
residential use which persons of modest means demand to satisfy their right to 
own a home” and that townhouses provide the opportunity to own or rent 
private dwellings with many of the benefits of single-family housing.140 Because 
this legitimate use was completely excluded under the township’s zoning, the 
dissent would have held that the township had not met its fair share of 
multifamily housing and could not “close [its] doors to moderate and low income 
persons who desire to own homes in such communities.”141 While the dissent 
focused on low-income individuals and the need for affordable housing by 
recognizing the major differences between various designs of multifamily 
housing, this has not been the approach followed by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. 
4. Focus on Classes of Uses, Not Classes of People 
Though there has been some language in this line of cases regarding the 
need for affordable housing as it pertains to exclusionary zoning and the fair-
share test, in 1993 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made clear that its analysis 
focuses on property rights rather than any goals of social justice. In BAC, Inc. v. 
Board of Supervisors,142 the court clarified that Surrick recognized “a clear 
distinction between restrictions on uses of property and exclusions of classes of 
people” and “only the former is the proper subject of the analysis we 
synthesized.”143 Because Surrick was based on the constitutional right to own 
and enjoy property, exclusion of classes of people simply does not factor into the 
analysis.144 Therefore, the court rejected a developer’s claim that the township 
was unconstitutionally excluding low-income individuals by failing to provide 
 
137. Elocin held that Springfield Township, a suburb of Philadelphia, was not a logical place for 
growth because it was almost entirely developed and had already provided its fair share of multifamily 
housing where twelve percent of all homes in Springfield were multifamily. 461 A.2d at 773. Kravitz 
held that Wrightstown Township, an outer Philadelphia suburb, was not a logical place for 
development due to its lack of major highways, mass transit, and significant employment centers; 
because the township had not made an effort to shirk its municipal responsibility, the court upheld the 
zoning ordinance. 460 A.2d at 1082-83.  
138. Kravitz, 460 A.2d at 1081. 
139. Elocin, 461 A.2d at 774 (Nix, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that townhouses 
provide “distinct legitimate use”); Kravitz, 460 A.2d at 1084-85 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that design of multifamily housing is relevant to whether zoning ordinance is exclusionary). 
140. Kravitz, 460 A.2d at 1084-85 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). 
141. Id. at 1087. 
142. 633 A.2d 144 (Pa. 1993). 
143. BAC, 633 A.2d at 147. 
144. Id. 
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zoning for mobile-home parks because the developer’s argument was based on 
allowances for a class of people rather than a class of uses.145 This approach is in 
clear contrast to New Jersey’s Mt. Laurel doctrine, where municipalities are 
affirmatively required to provide housing for low-income individuals.146 
Applying BAC, the commonwealth court in Precision Equities, Inc. v. 
Franklin Park Borough Zoning Hearing Board147 similarly rejected a developer’s 
claim that a borough did not provide its fair share of small lot sizes and was 
therefore exclusionary to low- and moderate-income people.148 The Zoning 
Hearing Board had denied the developer’s challenge, finding that nothing would 
prevent the developer from building expensive homes on smaller lots in light of 
the fact that the developer’s primary goal is to maximize profit.149 Therefore, 
allowing smaller lot sizes would not guarantee a fair share of low- and moderate-
income housing.150 The court agreed that the developer had not guaranteed 
affordable housing, and found that New Jersey, in its aggressive approach, “has 
recognized that reduction in lot size alone will not normally result in housing 
affordable by low and moderate income people.”151 This inquiry is irrelevant 
under Pennsylvania law, however, because fair share in Pennsylvania focuses on 
uses of land “rather than attempting to use zoning as a socio-economic tool to 
create housing for various classes of people.”152 The court concluded that this 
was the better approach, given the considerable difficulty New Jersey has 
experienced in implementing its fair-share policy.153  
In Heritage Building Group, Inc. v. Plumstead Township Board of 
Supervisors,154 a developer challenged an ordinance for not providing a fair share 
of affordable multifamily housing as allegedly required by Section 604 of the 
MPC, which requires that zoning is designed: 
“To provide for the use of land within the municipality for residential 
 
145. Id. 
146. See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of New Jersey’s Mt. Laurel doctrine.  
147. 646 A.2d 756 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994). 
148. Precision Equities, 646 A.2d at 758, 760. 
149. Id. at 758; see also C&M Developers, Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 
143, 158-59 (Pa. 2002) (invalidating one-acre minimum lot size because it was not substantially related 
to township’s interest in preserving farmland, where primary justification for lot-size requirement 
offered by township was to prevent building of large houses on small lots).  
150. Precision Equities, 646 A.2d at 758. 
151. Id. at 760 n.4 (citing S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel II), 
456 A.2d 390, 418-21 (N.J. 1983)). 
152. Id.  
153. Id. The court also rejected an equal protection challenge waged by the developer on the 
ground that the lot-size requirements were really racial classifications because racial minorities are 
more likely than whites to be low income and require affordable housing. Id. at 760-61. The court 
found this connection “too tenuous” in light of findings that New Jersey’s fair-share policy has resulted 
in more housing for homeowners who are “overwhelmingly white and suburban in origin.” Precision 
Equities, 646 A.2d at 761 n.6 (citing James J. Hartnett, Note, Affordable Housing, Exclusionary 
Zoning, and American Apartheid: Using Title VIII to Foster Statewide Racial Integration, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 89, 124 n.221 (1993)).  
154. 833 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). 
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housing of various dwelling types encompassing all basic forms of 
housing, including single-family and two-family dwellings, and a 
reasonable range of multifamily dwellings in various arrangements, 
mobile homes and mobile home parks, provided, however, that no 
zoning ordinance shall be deemed invalid for the failure to provide for 
any other specific dwelling type.”155  
The developer argued that the citation to Mt. Laurel in both Willistown and 
Surrick indicated that Pennsylvania law requires a fair share of affordable 
housing for all classes of people.156 The commonwealth court responded that 
Surrick’s citation included the disclaimer “‘[w]e are not bound by New Jersey’s 
purported vast expansion of zoning principles”157 and that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court clearly stated in BAC that Surrick applies only to the “line of 
cases striking down zoning schemes for restricting or excluding certain uses of 
property, not classes of people.”158 Therefore, following BAC and Precision 
Equities, the court held that Section 604 of the MPC does not require a 
municipality to provide affordable multifamily housing for low- to moderate-
income individuals.159 
5.  Continued Viability of the Fair-Share Test 
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed Surrick in In re 
Petition of Dolington Land Group,160 finding that Surrick “is sufficiently flexible 
in its proper application to accommodate the evolution of public land use 
priorities and concerns.”161 For the first time, the court considered the 
application of Surrick’s fair-share test in light of the “pressing problem” of 
sprawl in Pennsylvania.162 The court noted that between 1982 and 1997, 
developed land increased by 41.3% even though there was essentially no 
population growth.163  
In Dolington, a group of landowners challenged joint municipality zoning164 
 
155. Heritage, 833 A.2d at 1212 (quoting 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10604(4)). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1212 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Surrick v. 
Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 109 n.8 (Pa. 1977)).  
158. Id. at 1212-13 (quoting BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 146 (Pa. 1993) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
159. Id. at 1213. 
160. 839 A.2d 1021 (Pa. 2003). 
161. Dolington, 839 A.2d at 1027. 
162. Id. at 1028 n.8. 
163. Id. 
164. Jointures are a form of regional land-use planning, authorized by the MPC. 53 PA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 10801-A to 10821-A (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). These sections were added in 2000 as part of 
the “Growing Smarter” initiative, designed to give municipalities greater tools with which to combat 
sprawl and effectively plan their communities. Dennison, supra note 43, at 402. For a thorough 
discussion of the goals of the Growing Smarter program, see Dennison, supra note 43, at 402-07. As an 
incentive for municipalities to plan jointly, jointures offer some protection from curative amendment 
challenges by providing that the court must consider the availability of uses within the several 
municipalities involved in the joint planning rather than the particular municipality where the property 
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as exclusionary because of the small proportion of land zoned for multifamily 
housing.165 While declining to consider fully how Surrick applies to 
multimunicipal zoning, the court essentially applied the test to find that neither 
the jointure as a whole nor the municipality in which the questioned land was 
located were in the path of growth, therefore failing the threshold inquiry of 
Surrick.166 Importantly, the court acknowledged that the percentage of land 
available for multifamily housing in the jointure (3.58%) cannot be properly 
evaluated without considering the need for multifamily housing in the 
community.167 Finding that the provision in the zoning met the need for 
multifamily housing, the court held that the zoning did not produce an 
exclusionary effect or unreasonably restrict the landowner’s property rights.168  
While declining to overrule Surrick, the court indicated that its factual 
underpinnings have been undermined by changing social priorities, including 
increased concern for environmental protection, farmland preservation, and the 
need to contain sprawl.169 Noting these priorities, the court found that such 
concerns could justify a municipality’s decision to impose development 
restrictions of type, design, location, and intensity.170 
D. Exclusionary Zoning Challenges: The Curative Amendment Process 
When landowners desire to develop their land in a way prohibited by local 
zoning, they may allege that the zoning is exclusionary under the fair-share case 
law.171 Pennsylvania has established a curative amendment process whereby 
landowners can challenge the validity of a local zoning ordinance that prohibits 
or restricts the use of their property.172 In filing the curative amendment with the 
 
is situated. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11006-A(b.1) (West Supp. 2007); Dennison, supra note 43, at 406. 
Interestingly, the Growing Smarter initiative lists the development of “affordable and other types of 
housing in numbers consistent with the need for such housing” as one of the purposes behind the 
changes, though there is no affirmative obligation on jointures to provide for affordable housing. 53 
PA. STAT. ANN. § 11101(12).  
165. Dolington, 839 A.2d at 1024-25. 
166. Id. at 1029-30. 
167. See id. at 1030 (noting that percentage of land available for multifamily dwellings under 
zoning ordinance “‘must be considered in light of current population growth pressure, within the 
community as well as the region, and . . . the total amount of undeveloped land in the community’” 
(quoting Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 111 (Pa. 1977))).  
168. Id. at 1030, 1034. 
169. Id. at 1032. 
170. Dolington, 839 A.2d at 1032. 
171. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania fair-share case law, see supra Part II.C. 
172. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10609.1(a) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). Curative amendments are very 
similar to substantive challenges, which predate the 1972 amendments to the MPC, and a landowner 
may elect to pursue either course. The primary difference is that curative amendments are heard 
before the municipality’s governing body (such as the Board of Supervisors) and substantive 
challenges are heard before the municipality’s Zoning Hearing Board. See Jan Z. Krasnowiecki & LB 
Kregenow, Zoning and Planning Litigation Procedures Under the Revised Pennsylvania Municipalities 
Planning Code, 39 VILL. L. REV. 879, 885-87 (1994) (comparing curative amendments and substantive 
challenges). Substantive challenges and curative amendments are also available to landowners seeking 
to develop their land into commercial uses (e.g., quarries or car dealerships) prohibited by zoning 
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municipality, “the landowner seeks to ‘cure’ a perceived defect in the zoning 
ordinance in order to allow a particular development or use favored by the 
landowner.”173 The curative amendment process was added to the MPC in 1972 
“to insure that affordable housing was available in suburban communities, where 
exclusionary zoning was common.”174 
After filing a request for a curative amendment, the landowner is entitled to 
a hearing on the issue,175 and the governing body may decide to grant, modify, or 
deny the cure.176 In deciding whether the curative amendment has merit, the 
municipality considers the impact of the proposed development on municipal 
services and facilities, regional housing needs, suitability of the site based on 
natural characteristics and the impact of the development on these resources, 
and the projected impact on agriculture and other public-welfare issues.177 In 
effect, the municipality seeks to ensure that it has not entirely excluded certain 
residential uses, and, if the municipality is a logical place for growth under 
Surrick, to determine whether it has provided its fair share of various housing 
types. If the municipality denies the curative amendment, the landowner may 
appeal to state court.178 
E. Doctrine of Definitive Relief 
When a municipality loses a curative amendment challenge in state court, 
which the landowner brought after the municipality’s governing board denied 
the curative amendment, the court will normally order a change in the zoning 
affecting the property.179 Upon invalidating a zoning ordinance, the doctrine of 
definitive relief allows the court to order the requested relief on behalf of the 
successful challenger.180 This “site-specific” remedy will often result in a 
 
ordinances. This Comment focuses exclusively on residential rather than commercial uses. 
173. Dennison, supra note 43, at 400. 
174. Id. at 401 (citing 1972 Pa. Laws 333). For a discussion of how the curative amendment 
process is not achieving these goals, see infra Part II.F. See also Krasnowiecki & Kregenow, supra note 
172, at 879 (“The 1972 MPC was designed to tip the balance in favor of new development and against 
the exclusionary tendencies of local governments.”). 
175. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10609.1(a). 
176. Id. § 10609.1(b),(c).  
177. Id. § 10609.1(c). 
178. Id. § 10609.1(b). 
179. Id. (indicating that entire zoning ordinance is not thereby invalidated); Dennison, supra note 
43, at 401 (citing GOVERNOR’S CTR. FOR LOCAL GOV’T SERVS., 1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON LAND USE 
23 (2000)).  
180. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 328 A.2d 464, 469 (Pa. 1974) (finding that anything less 
than definitive relief would be “grossly inequitable” to developer after developer invested effort and 
capital in legal challenge). The developer must still comply with other municipal requirements, 
however, such as building codes, before receiving the definitive relief from the court. Id. The principle 
of definitive relief is codified at 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11006-A(c). The court may grant relief upon a 
showing of preliminary plans or sketches, provided that the developer submits other documents before 
final relief is granted. Id. § 11006-A(e). In the commercial use analogue, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court has held that de facto exclusion in a severable provision does not require site-specific relief. 
H.R. Miller Co. v. Bd., 605 A.2d 321, 325-26 (Pa. 1992) (affirming lower courts’ refusal to grant site-
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development being built in an area ill equipped or ill suited for that type of 
development.181 If a municipality amends its zoning in an attempt to cure a 
constitutional problem after the developer has challenged the zoning, the 
doctrine of definitive relief allows the court to order the developer’s requested 
relief for the property in question even if the municipality has determined that 
use to be better suited for other property available in the community.182 Such 
judicial orders will often result in the developer and municipality stipulating to a 
different use of the property, such as building large single-family homes on small 
lots rather than the multifamily housing for which the developer brought the 
curative amendment challenge.183 Even the threat of a curative amendment 
challenge and this definitive relief will often persuade a municipality to negotiate 
with a developer before or during judicial proceedings. Advocates of the 
definitive relief doctrine argue that courts must be able to issue complete 
remedies to challengers to protect them from retaliatory municipalities.184 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that a landowner would invest the time and money 
required by litigation to secure zoning changes if such changes did not apply to 
their property.185 
F. Curative Amendments Used as a Tool to Build Luxury Housing 
1. “Sue and Switch” 
There is significant evidence that developers are using the curative 
amendment process and doctrine of definitive relief “to build what they want, 
where they want” for the purpose of constructing luxury suburban homes rather 
 
specific relief to quarry company when land was in residential area and zoning ordinance could be 
cured merely by striking five-hundred-foot setback requirement). This distinction has not been applied 
in residential-use cases in Pennsylvania. 
181. Dennison, supra note 43, at 401 (citing GOVERNOR’S CTR. FOR LOCAL GOV’T SERVS., supra 
note 179, at 23). 
182. See Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585, 588-91 (Pa. 1985) (approving developer’s 
plans for multifamily complex in area zoned for one-acre lot-size minimums, even though township 
had provided for ample zoning for multifamily housing elsewhere in municipality after developer filed 
his challenge). The concurrence in Fernley argued that this was an “absurd” application of the doctrine 
of definitive relief and that municipalities should be permitted to make a good-faith effort to amend 
their zoning to comport with constitutional requirements. Id. at 595 (McDermott, J., concurring); see 
also Bd. of Supervisors v. Barness, 382 A.2d 140, 143 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (approving definitive 
relief for developer even though comprehensive plan that cured zoning ordinance’s constitutional 
infirmity was being prepared before developers sued). 
183. See Buckingham Township, supra note 10 (listing thousands of units of multifamily housing 
approved by court, and listing single-family homes, high-end townhouses, and mobile-home 
community built instead).  
184. See Krasnowiecki & Kregenow, supra note 172, at 894 (“Local governments that have 
demonstrated their exclusionary bent cannot be trusted to treat the challenger fairly . . . .”).  
185. See id. at 900 (“The purpose of definitive or site specific relief is to reward the challenger for 
pointing out constitutional infirmities in the zoning ordinance; otherwise, no one will have the 
incentive to do so.”). 
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than affordable housing.186 Though lawmakers originally envisioned the curative 
amendment process as a means by which to combat exclusionary zoning 
practices,187 the process has instead given developers a powerful tool to wield 
over municipalities, generating “[a] proliferation of upscale housing.”188 
Developers often utilize a “sue and switch”189 tactic, wherein they propose to 
build mobile homes or multifamily housing with a desire instead to build single-
family housing.190 For example, developers may wish to build large homes on 
small lots, a use that may be prohibited by a municipality’s minimum lot-size 
requirements but not unconstitutionally excluded.191 Often, the threat of 
building mobile homes or multifamily housing is enough to compel 
municipalities to allow the developer to build the desired single-family homes 
instead. If a developer successfully sues for definitive relief, the municipality 
then has a strong incentive to negotiate with the developer.192 One luxury-home 
builder called the curative amendment process “the big hammer” that 
developers use to force their plans through municipalities.193 A public official 
called it “‘pure assault . . . purely blackmail-oriented.’”194 
This “sue and switch” technique is not uncommon.195 The Heritage 
Conservancy has documented at least seven instances in the past twenty years of 
developers filing curative amendments to build mobile homes in municipalities 
that excluded such use and, after judicial success, building single-family homes or 
townhouses instead.196 One township manager said that developers are using 
mobile homes “‘as a smoke screen.’”197 
Public officials have repeatedly called for changes to the curative 
amendment process. Before the state legislature made changes to the MPC in 
2000 with the Growing Smarter legislation, local officials called for a revision of 
 
186. Diane Mastrull & Evan Halper, Land-Use Battles Frustrate Pa. Towns, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
Mar. 12, 2000, at A1.  
187. Dennison, supra note 43, at 401; see also Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186 (stating that law 
was designed “to provide a legal mechanism to make sure that housing for everyone was built in the 
suburbs, where exclusionary zoning was common”). 
188. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186; see also Evan Halper, Gathering Support for Preserving 
Farmland: Volleys of Costly Court Challenges by Developers Have Led Local Officials to Band 
Together and Seek State Help, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 7, 1999, at BC1 (detailing costs of curative 
amendments for municipalities).  
189. ADAM LIOZ, PENNENVIRONMENT, LAND USE IN PENNSYLVANIA: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CHANGES TO PENNSYLVANIA’S MUNICIPALITIES PLANNING CODE IN 2000, at 18 (2001), available at 
http://static.pennenvironment.org/reports/landusereport8_01.pdf.  
190. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186. 
191. For a description of this process, see Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186. 
192. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of municipal motivations to negotiate with developers to 
avoid many units of multifamily housing. 
193. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Damon Aherne, chairman of Tinicum Township 
Planning Commission). 
195. LIOZ, supra note 189, at 18; Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186.  
196. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186. 
197. Id. (quoting Allen Heist, township manager of West Vincent Township in Chester County). 
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the curative amendment process.198 One Bucks County coalition called curative 
amendments “the single greatest vehicle for development sprawl” and “nothing 
more than a way to circumvent our communities’ land use plans.”199 The 
coalition argued that “[t]he process is a charade, funded and borne by the 
individual taxpayers of Pennsylvania, profiting only the developers. It must be 
changed.”200 As part of the Growing Smarter initiative, Governor Tom Ridge’s 
administration held fifty-three public forums across Pennsylvania on land use, 
finding that “[p]robably no other issue generated more frustration . . . than the 
curative amendment.”201 The Governor’s Center for Local Services suggested 
that the legislature amend the MPC to allow for non-site-specific curative 
amendments.202 
Nevertheless, the resulting Growing Smarter legislation provided only a 
“modicum of relief” against the misuse of curative amendments.203 The 
legislation focused on facilitating regional planning and provided that reviewing 
courts must consider the availability of uses within the several municipalities 
joined in regional planning rather than the particular municipality where the 
property is situated.204 Requests from public officials to rein in the misuse of the 
curative amendment process, such as eliminating the doctrine of definitive relief 
in order to better allow municipalities to plan effectively, went largely 
unheeded.205 
2. One Example: Buckingham, Pennsylvania 
Buckingham Township in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, is a prime example 
of developers’ manipulation of the fair-share requirement and the curative 
amendment process to build expensive single-family housing.206 In 1978, the 
 
198. For a discussion of the Growing Smarter legislation, see supra note 164. For thorough 
analyses of the legislation, see generally LIOZ, supra note 189, and Dennison, supra note 43. 
199. Press Release, Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., Local Government Coalition Calls for Land Use 
Reform (Nov. 6, 1998) (on file with author) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
200. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Robert J. Mason, Confronting Sprawl in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania: New Options for Communities, 23 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 23, 38 
(2004) (detailing study’s findings that many municipal officials in Montgomery and Chester Counties 
in Pennsylvania find curative amendments to be impediment to effective planning). 
201. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
202. Dennison, supra note 43, at 398. 
203. Id. at 386. 
204. 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11006-A(b.1) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007); Dennison, supra note 43, at 
406. 
205. See Dennison, supra note 43, at 386 (describing “modicum of relief” legislature provided to 
municipalities by giving them greater protection against curative amendments when engaged in joint 
planning). 
206. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to conduct an empirical analysis of curative 
amendment challenges since the law’s inception in 1972, but such a study would be quite useful to 
determine exactly how developers are using the process. While not necessarily statistically significant, 
the history of Buckingham’s experience with curative amendments illustrates how the curative 
amendment process functions in practice and helps inform the legal analysis.  
ROWAN_FINAL  
2007] COMMENTS 1293 
 
commonwealth court in Board of Supervisors v. Barness207 upheld seven 
landowners’ challenges to Buckingham’s zoning ordinance which required 
single-family homes on minimum lot sizes of 10,000 square feet.208 The ordinance 
admittedly excluded multifamily housing and mobile-home parks, and the 
township was in the process of preparing a new comprehensive plan to cure the 
zoning’s constitutional infirmity when landowners sued the township after it 
denied their request for a curative amendment.209 
Six of the landowners had submitted plans for apartments and townhouses, 
and the other landowner had proposed a mobile-home park.210 The court of 
common pleas had determined that these uses were unconstitutionally excluded 
from Buckingham under the old zoning and refused to consider the zoning 
changes because they had not been advertised before the landowners filed the 
curative amendment request.211 The commonwealth court affirmed, finding that 
the township had not overcome its burden of demonstrating that a threat to 
health, safety, and general welfare existed such as to justify the exclusion of 
multifamily dwellings and mobile-home parks.212 The lower court ordered 
Buckingham to issue building permits once the developers complied with the 
building code and other administrative requirements, and the commonwealth 
court affirmed.213 
For the most part, however, the proposed housing was never built. Instead, 
the landowners developed expensive single-family housing, negotiated with the 
township after the courts approved more than 7000 units of multifamily 
housing.214 The successful curative amendment resulted in over 1100 single-
family homes.215 These homes, in several different developments, sell from 
$400,000 to $750,000.216 Some multifamily housing was built—272 townhouses—
but these routinely sell for over $425,000 today,217 illustrating why multifamily 
housing is not necessarily synonymous with affordable housing. 
While the mobile-home park was indeed built, “Buckingham Springs” is a 
community with homes currently selling for approximately $200,000, plus land 
rental costs of over $400 a month.218 Though technically comprising mobile 
 
207. 382 A.2d 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978). 
208. Barness, 382 A.2d at 141. 
209. Id. at 141-42. 
210. Id. at 142. 
211. Schlanger v. Buckingham Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 29 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 280, 283-85 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. 1976). 
212. Barness, 382 A.2d at 142. The township had asserted interests justifying its attempts to 
constrain development, including the inconvenience and expense of increased public demand for 
facilities and the need to protect the character of the community. The court responded that “all of the 
law . . . is against them.” Id.  
213. Id. at 142 n.2. For a further discussion on the doctrine of definitive relief, see supra Part II.E. 
214. Buckingham Township, supra note 10.  
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id.  
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homes, this community is hardly “affordable” for any low-income resident.219 
Buckingham had a significant incentive to negotiate with these landowners 
once they had won definitive relief from the courts. The court of common pleas 
approved ten units per acre for the proposed multifamily housing, and five 
mobile homes per acre for the proposed mobile-home park.220 If built as 
proposed and approved by the court, Buckingham would have been home to 
7400 new households living in multifamily housing and 755 new households 
living in mobile homes.221 In 1978, the year of the commonwealth court decision, 
Buckingham was primarily rural and only beginning to deal with the 
development pressures, which would rapidly escalate in the next thirty years. 
The 1970 census indicated that Buckingham was home to only 5150 residents and 
1609 housing units.222 Adding 8155 new households is a significant burden for 
any municipality.223 
Instead, 1184 single-family homes were built along with 272 luxury 
townhouses and 646 expensive mobile homes.224 The township approved these 
homes in the face of the massive development otherwise mandated by the 
court.225 The landowners could not have won a curative amendment challenge 
against the township to build these single-family homes because their legal 
argument was based on the exclusion of multifamily housing and mobile homes 
from the township’s zoning. 
In 2005, Buckingham Township enacted new “Living Communities” zoning, 
which requires developers to build a variety of types of housing, as well as 
provide for open-space set-asides and commercial or civic spaces.226 For tracts 
larger than thirty acres with twenty or more dwelling units planned, the 
ordinance provides for small lot sizes and requires that the unit types be 
 
219. For a discussion of housing affordability in Pennsylvania, and Bucks Country in particular, 
see NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2006: PENNSYLVANIA (2006), available at 
http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2006/data.cfm?getstate=on&getcounty=on&county=2224&state=PA. 
220. Buckingham Township, supra note 10. 
221. Id. 
222. Bucks County Planning Commission, supra note 2. 
223. Nevertheless, concerns about strain on infrastructure and resources have been repeatedly 
rejected by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as a legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Appeal of 
Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 398-99 (Pa. 1970) (holding that municipalities must “bear [their] rightful part of 
the burden” and allow for population growth). The court did acknowledge in Dolington, however, that 
environmental protection, farmland preservation, and the need to contain sprawl are all considerations 
that may be properly taken into account when a municipality imposes development restrictions of 
type, design, location, and intensity. In re Petition of Dolington Land Group, 839 A.2d 1021, 1032 (Pa. 
2003). 
224. Buckingham Township, supra note 10. 
225. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186. 
226. The ordinance provides: 
 A living community (“LC”) is a development that allows for residential housing of 
various dwelling types encouraging all basic forms of housing including single-family and 
two-family dwellings, and a range of multifamily dwellings in various arrangements, mobile 
homes, and mobile home parks, in accordance with the specific district requirements. 
BUCKINGHAM, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 405.B.B14 (2005). 
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mixed.227 No more than fifty percent of the units can be single-family detached 
housing, and the remaining fifty percent must be composed of at least two other 
housing types.228 Additionally, “[t]o promote diversity,” the ordinance prohibits 
the different types of housing units from being segregated within these “Living 
Communities” neighborhoods.229 
The “Living Communities” zoning was enacted as part of Buckingham’s 
defensive plan against curative amendments and to force developers to “respond 
to actual needs of a community.”230 It provides for a mix of housing types and 
small lot sizes.231 Though these are the changes that developers have been 
requesting in Pennsylvania when arguing that a municipality’s zoning is 
exclusionary, new development has all but stopped in Buckingham now that 
developers are actually required to build various types of housing.232 The “Living 
Communities” zoning has not yet been legally challenged by developers.233 
3. Another Example: Southampton, Pennsylvania 
Evidence suggests that Buckingham has not had a unique experience with 
curative amendments. For example, in Stahl v. Upper Southampton Township 
Zoning Hearing Board,234 a property owner challenged the zoning ordinance of 
Upper Southampton, a Philadelphia suburb, for unduly restricting mobile-home 
parks.235 Though the ordinance provided for mobile homes, the property owner 
argued that the minimum lot-size and density requirements amounted to a de 
facto exclusion of mobile homes because building them would be economically 
infeasible.236 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found that the property 
owners did not meet their burden of proving that the township did not provide a 
fair share of land for mobile homes because there was no evidence in the record 
as to the township’s percentage of undeveloped land.237 Nevertheless, the court 
held that the zoning ordinance unduly restricted the development of mobile 
homes because the density and minimum lot-size requirements made the 
 
227. Id.  
228. Id. 
229. Id. § 405.B.B14.D.2.d. 
230. Interview with Raymond Stepnoski, Twp. Manager, Buckingham Twp. (Nov. 22, 2006); see 
also Matthew P. Blanchard, Tide Turns in Fight Against Sprawl, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 3, 2001, at 
BC1 (describing how curative amendment process has changed municipal planning).  
231. BUCKINGHAM, PA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 405.B.B14.  
232. Interview with Raymond Stepnoski, supra note 230. Mr. Stepnoski stressed that 
Buckingham’s zoning change was not an attempt to force development out of Buckingham and into 
neighboring communities and that the shift of development pressures is an unintended consequence of 
the new zoning. Id. 
233. Id. Mr. Stepnoski said that Buckingham does not expect any legal challenges because “[t]he 
concept of a living community is one that derived from careful consideration of development trends 
and community desires.” Id. 
234. 606 A.2d 960 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). 
235. Stahl, 606 A.2d at 961. 
236. Id. at 961-62. 
237. Id. at 963. 
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ordinance’s provision for mobile-home parks “illusory” and a de facto 
exclusion.238 The court approved the property owner’s request for decreased lot-
size and density requirements for a mobile-home park.239 
The developer never built mobile homes on this tract of land.240 Instead, the 
developer negotiated with the township to build fifty-five single-family homes on 
small lots, which the neighbors preferred to the prospect of a mobile-home 
park.241 Today, these homes have market values of approximately $450,000.242  
III. DISCUSSION 
Though curative amendments were intended to combat exclusionary zoning 
and help create an adequate supply of affordable housing,243 developers have 
instead manipulated the process to force upscale housing into unwilling 
municipalities.244 Curative amendments impose costly burdens on municipalities, 
which must go to great expense to defend themselves against developers. Also, 
curative amendments and the doctrine of definitive relief undermine a 
municipality’s ability to plan effectively for development. Successful curative 
amendments too often result in luxury suburban housing rather than affordable 
housing.245 In great part, this result is due to the Pennsylvania case law, which 
does not require that the housing built be affordable,246 and the doctrine of 
definitive relief, which does not require the developer to build the type of 
housing for which he sued if he settles or later negotiates with the 
municipality.247 
Therefore, several changes are suggested.248 First, developers should be 
awarded non-site-specific relief so that municipalities can better plan for new 
development. Second, municipalities should enact inclusionary zoning 
ordinances to require developers building within their borders to construct 
affordable housing. Third, municipalities within a region, including neighboring 
cities, should work together to combat sprawl so that urban areas are 
reinvigorated and affordable housing can be built in both cities and suburbs. 
 
238. Id. at 966. 
239. Id. at 967-68. 
240. Interview with Joseph Golden, Twp. Manager, Upper Southampton Twp. (Feb. 22, 2007).  
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Dennison, supra note 43, at 401. 
244. See supra Part II.F for a description of how developers can manipulate the curative 
amendment process. 
245. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of how curative amendments have not succeeded in 
effectively generating affordable housing. 
246. See BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993) (noting that fair-share 
analysis considers restrictions on property uses rather than exclusions of classes of people). 
247. See supra Part II.E for an explanation of the doctrine of definitive relief. 
248. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of these suggested solutions. 
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A. Burdens Imposed on Municipalities by Curative Amendments 
The curative amendment process imposes significant burdens on 
municipalities. One township supervisor protested that the municipal planning 
process has been disrupted and compromised by “‘repeated curative 
amendments that sap our energies, deplete our budget, and[,] worst of all, 
threaten to upset all of our planning and zoning.’”249 
First, fighting curative amendments is extremely expensive. Because 
developers can repeatedly file curative amendments for the same parcel, one 
township solicitor said that “‘[p]art of the game plan of most of these developers 
who file these type of challenges is to bludgeon local governments into 
conceding because of the cost[s].’”250  
Extensive curative amendment challenges can cost a municipality thousands 
of dollars in extra meeting costs and hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
litigation costs.251 Curative amendments can drive up the cost of housing, as 
developers also spend hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in legal 
fees against municipalities.252 Though the lawsuits continue, municipalities have 
been winning the battles more often by crafting their zoning more carefully to 
enable it to sustain legal challenge.253 
Second, curative amendments, and especially the doctrine of definitive 
relief, compromise a municipality’s ability to plan for growth in designated areas 
and in certain ways. One study of municipal officials in Montgomery County and 
Chester County in Pennsylvania found that many saw curative amendments as 
“an obstacle to achieving local planning objectives.”254 When a developer wins a 
challenge, he is entitled to build on his property either what he proposed or what 
he negotiated with the municipality, subject only to building codes and other 
administrative regulations.255 
 
249. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186 (quoting Kate Harper, Lower Gwynedd Township 
Supervisor, Statement to Kim Coon, Governor Ridge’s Top Land-Use Advisor (Summer 1999)).  
250. Halper, supra note 188 (quoting John Rice, Solicitor, Bedminster and Plumstead 
Townships). 
251. See id. (noting that each extra meeting costs about $1,000.00); Mastrull & Halper, supra note 
186 (noting that Plumstead Township; Wrightstown, Upper Makefield, and Newtown Townships, 
collectively; and Bedminster Township have spent $500,000, $380,000, and $170,000, respectively, in 
legal fees).  
252. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186.  
253. See Blanchard, supra note 230 (“‘We no longer think growth can be stopped. . . . Those 
would be illegal thoughts, . . . Growth is to be managed, directed, controlled.’” (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Eric Schaffhausen, Bedminster Supervisor)).  
254. Mason, supra note 200, at 38. 
255. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 11006-A(c) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (stating that court may 
approve described development in full or in part and, if approved in part, then governing body may 
adopt alternative restrictions that are in accordance with court’s order); Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 
328 A.2d 464, 468-69 (Pa. 1974) (establishing doctrine of definitive relief by holding that municipality 
may not prevent successful zoning challenger from proceeding with development by adopting curative 
measure not in place prior to filing of challenger’s application). The “suitability of the proposed site 
and various health and safety considerations” may also be evaluated by the court. Fernley v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 502 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa. 1985). 
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In Fernley v. Board of Supervisors,256 the township had amended its zoning 
to cure the constitutional infirmity of failing to provide for apartment buildings 
but had not considered or advertised the zoning change until the developer filed 
a curative amendment.257 The court granted definitive relief, subject to 
compliance with the township’s building codes.258 Justice McDermott’s 
concurring and dissenting opinion agreed that the ordinance was 
unconstitutionally exclusionary but found that the decision granting the 
developer site-specific relief was “absurd” because it “mandat[ed] the approval 
of a huge multi-family complex, situated in the middle of a single-acre-zoned 
community, based on the rather fortuitous circumstance that the absentee owner 
of this land arrived at the court house prior to an apparently well-intentioned 
zoning amendment.”259 Justice McDermott argued that “[c]ommunities should 
be permitted to make a good faith attempt to amend their ordinances, without 
having a possible white elephant foisted upon them to forever remind them of 
their past errors.”260 
As a result of losing a cure, a municipality may feel that it has no choice but 
to negotiate with the developer or face a use on a piece of property that is in 
discord with its zoning and planning. Curative amendments cause a municipality 
to “‘lose[] control over its ability to plan for the orderly development of its 
community.’”261 One of former Governor Ridge’s top advisers said that “‘[t]here 
are very good plans out there that are being undermined by the curative 
amendment process.’”262 
Developers argue, however, that site-specific relief is necessary to “‘keep 
local government honest’”263 and prevent retaliation by municipalities.264 Also, 
without the site-specific relief, the court or municipality could conclude that the 
use was better suited to a parcel of property the developer does not own, thus 
removing the developer’s financial incentive for filing curative amendments.265 
Effective planning is also inhibited by unpredictability. “Fair share” has 
never been specifically quantified so that municipalities can be assured that their 
zoning meets all of the constitutional requirements.266 As a result, developers 
 
256. 502 A.2d 585 (Pa. 1985). 
257. Fernley, 502 A.2d at 587-88. 
258. Id. at 590. 
259. Id. at 595 (McDermott, J., concurring and dissenting). 
260. Id. 
261. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186 (quoting Stephen Harris, attorney who used curative 
amendment process to develop quarry in Plumstead Township, Bucks County).  
262. Id. (quoting Kim Coon, adviser to former Governor Ridge). 
263. Id. (quoting Duane Searles of Home Builders Association of Bucks and Montgomery 
Counties). 
264. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 328 A.2d 464, 468 (Pa. 1974) (“[A]n applicant, successful 
in having a zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional, should not be frustrated in his quest for relief 
by a retributory township.”). 
265. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186. 
266. See Twp. of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 341 A.2d 466, 469 (Pa. 1975) (Pomeroy, 
J., dissenting) (noting that plurality failed to define “fair share” or explain why township at issue did 
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can seize on and exploit this uncertainty to force through housing projects by 
threatening to file a curative amendment.267 
B. Curative Amendments Do Not Effectively Generate Affordable Housing 
Developers’ manipulation of the curative amendment process, and 
municipalities’ response to it, all obscure the crisis in Pennsylvania’s growing 
suburbs: the need to create affordable housing. Because developers are not 
required to build the housing type for which they sued (if they then negotiate 
with the municipality), successful curative amendments are by no means 
guaranteed to result in affordable housing. There is great irony in the fact that a 
law envisioned to combat exclusionary zoning and ensure affordable housing is 
instead being manipulated to force luxury housing into communities that have 
carefully tried to plan for their growth.268 Buckingham’s township manager 
stated that “[c]urative amendments have not, as originally intended, corrected 
zoning injustices in municipalities” and have instead actually created more 
housing that is unaffordable to low- or moderate-income families.269 
Furthermore, “[i]t seems that [the drafters of the curative amendment process] 
never considered how [the process] could be exploited.”270 
Developers, not social-justice groups, are the entities bringing curative 
amendment challenges against municipalities. Appropriately, developers’ 
primary concern is building a marketable product that will generate profit, not 
furthering a social goal of providing affordable housing.271 A vice president of a 
building association stated in a panel discussion on the costs of sprawl that 
“[b]uilders are willing to build what they can sell, and if that’s what sells, they’ll 
build it. If a 15-story building sold in Lancaster County, you’d see 15-story 
apartment buildings all over the county.”272 By vesting so much power in 
developers with the builders’ remedy of the definitive relief doctrine, courts 
allow developers to build what is profitable and marketable rather than what is 
affordable. Trying to combat the legitimate problem of exclusionary zoning 
should not rest on what developers choose to build. 
When developers surreptitiously propose to build multifamily housing or 
mobile homes, in hopes that the municipality will agree to single-family homes 
instead, developers seize on fears that low-income people will inhabit the 
 
not satisfy test). 
267. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186. 
268. Id. 
269. Interview with Raymond Stepnoski, supra note 230. 
270. Id. 
271. Mr. Stepnoski noted that “[t]he housing industry is no different than any other widget 
producing industry. There’s a product and a profit. The goal is to maximize profit. There are a few 
notable exceptions, however these tend to be local developers and not the nationally recognized 
companies.” Id. 
272. Rick Brown, Executive Vice President, Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Lancaster, Remarks at an 
Hourglass Foundation Public Forum: Costs of Sprawl 21 (June 7, 2000) (transcript available at 
http://www.hourglassfoundation.org/hgf/lib/hgf/white_papers/costs_of_sprawl_6-7-00_transcript.doc).  
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wealthy suburbs by “‘wav[ing] the bloody flag of affordable housing.’”273 In this 
way, the curative amendment process may further “stratify and exclude 
people.”274 In early decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed 
concern over public officials and residents wanting to exclude low-income 
individuals from their community. For example, in National Land & Investment 
Co. v. Kohn,275 the court found that “[w]hat basically appears to bother 
intervenors is that a small number of lovely old homes will have to start keeping 
company with a growing number of smaller, less expensive, more densely located 
houses.”276 Similarly, in Appeal of Girsh,277 the court noted that “much of the 
opposition to apartment uses in suburban communities is based on fictitious 
emotional appeals which insist on characterizing all apartments as being 
equivalent to the worst big-city tenements.”278 
 It is important to note that municipalities may have legitimate reasons for 
wanting to control development, including multifamily housing. Sprawl is of 
paramount concern to many public officials, particularly in the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area, and many municipalities have limited infrastructure with 
which to handle increased development.279 For example, new development may 
necessitate more schools, public utilities, and traffic control.280 As a result, local 
taxes rise, which harms low- and middle-income people already living in the 
suburban community.281 Additionally, suburban sprawl hurts low-income 
individuals who live in the cities being decimated by population loss and 
decreased tax bases.282 
Therefore, when negotiations between a municipality and developer result 
in single-family homes rather than multifamily housing, this does not necessarily 
reflect distaste for affordable housing or the lower-income individuals who may 
reside there. Instead, the municipality may be trying to limit the number of new 
households in its community in an effort to control sprawl and growth. For 
example, the successful curative amendments in Buckingham Township in 
1978283 resulted in 1184 single-family homes, 272 townhouses, and 646 mobile 
 
273. Mastrull & Halper, supra note 186 (quoting Dan Hoffman, Policy Director, Pennsylvania 
Low-Income Housing Coalition). 
274. Id. (quoting Joanne Denworth, president of 10,000 Friends, a coalition of conservation and 
environmental groups). 
275. 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965). 
276. Nat’l Land, 215 A.2d at 612. 
277. 263 A.2d 395 (Pa. 1970). 
278. Girsh, 263 A.2d at 399 n.5. 
279. See Mason, supra note 200, at 33 (detailing survey results that indicated that local officials in 
Chester and Montgomery Counties are concerned about sprawl, even in municipalities not 
experiencing high rates of development). 
280. THE BROOKINGS INST., supra note 30, at 46-63.  
281. Id.  
282. Id.  
283. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Barness, 382 A.2d 140, 141, 144 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) 
(noting township’s failure to cure its invalid zoning ordinance).  
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homes, rather than 7400 units of multifamily housing and 755 mobile homes.284 
By negotiating with the landowners, Buckingham prevented over 6000 additional 
housing units from being built.285 Nevertheless, it remains critical for courts and 
observers to be vigilant in monitoring municipal bias against low-income families 
and affordable housing. 
C. Problems with Focusing on Property Rather than People 
The manipulation of the curative amendment process, designed to combat 
exclusionary zoning and instead used to generate luxury suburban housing, has 
resulted because the fair-share analysis on which the curative amendment 
process is built does not require the provision of affordable housing. Instead, 
municipalities need only provide for a variety of housing uses, with no 
requirement that any of these uses (including multifamily housing and mobile 
homes) be affordable. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made clear that the fair-share test is 
based on property rights rather than a social need for affordable housing. In 
BAC, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,286 the court clarified that the fair-share test 
inquires as to the exclusion of uses of property rather than classes of people. 287 
Therefore, while the fair-share test requires municipalities to provide for some 
form of multifamily housing, there is no requirement that the housing be 
affordable to low- or moderate-income families. Additionally, municipalities are 
not required to provide for various types of multifamily housing, even though 
apartments may be significantly more affordable than townhouses.288 
The court’s requirement of various housing types may acknowledge the 
need for affordable housing, as the court has employed its fair-share analysis to 
invalidate large minimum lot sizes and exclusion of multifamily housing.289 
Nevertheless, dense single-family housing, multifamily housing, and mobile 
homes are not by definition “affordable.” One scholar noted that, “[w]hile multi-
family housing is often cheaper than single-family housing, it need not be.”290 
For example, the townhouses built in Buckingham as a result of the 1978 
curative amendment now sell for over $400,000 and the mobile homes sell for 
over $200,000, plus they cost over $400 a month in land rent.291 Even single-
family homes on small lots can be expensive; for example, the trend of 
“mansionization” in the inner suburbs describes the tearing down of small homes 
on small lots and building large, luxury homes in their place.292 
 
284. Buckingham Township, supra note 10. 
285. See id. (allowing total of 8155 housing units, but building only 2102 units). 
286. 633 A.2d 144 (Pa. 1993). 
287. BAC, 633 A.2d at 147. 
288. See supra Part II.C.3 for a discussion of how courts do not differentiate between different 
forms of multifamily housing. 
289. Span, supra note 45, at 38-39. 
290. Id. at 43. 
291. Buckingham Township, supra note 10. 
292. Durkin, supra note 62, at 467-68. 
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There are other undercurrents throughout the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decisions that reflect concern for creating affordable housing. For 
example, the plurality in Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.293 
and majority in Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board294 cited New Jersey’s Southern 
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mt. Laurel I)295 
decision as support for its development of the fair-share test despite the fact that 
Mt. Laurel I focuses on affordability rather than providing for various housing 
types as required by Pennsylvania’s property rights doctrine.296 Though the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in BAC roundly rejected the notion that the fair-
share test is concerned with housing affordability,297 the citations shed some light 
onto the concerns motivating the development of the fair-share requirement. 
As the test is formulated and applied, however, housing affordability simply 
does not factor into the analysis. While it is unclear that Pennsylvania would 
benefit from an extensive approach to affordable housing like New Jersey,298 
what is clear for now is that the curative amendment process is not effectively 
generating affordable housing. 
D. Proposed Solutions 
Given the extraordinary need for affordable housing in Pennsylvania, the 
misuse of the curative amendment process and the inability of the fair-share test 
to guarantee the production of affordable housing are particularly problematic. 
The following are some possible solutions, designed to stop abuses of the 
curative amendment process and generate meaningful affordable housing. 
1. Allow Non-Site-Specific Judicial Relief for Successful Challenges 
If a developer successfully challenges a zoning ordinance as exclusionary, 
the municipality should be permitted to accommodate the use in the most 
appropriate location, depending on its infrastructure restrictions and planning 
goals. The doctrine of definitive relief simply does not make sense given the “sue 
and switch” tactics employed by developers. If a zoning ordinance excludes a 
housing use, the municipality should be able to plan for where that use would be 
best accommodated. Also, limiting the number of times a developer may file a 
curative amendment on a given property would reduce the burden on 
municipalities, which must constantly defend against such attacks.299 
 
293. 341 A.2d 466 (Pa. 1975). 
294. 382 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1977). 
295. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
296. Surrick, 382 A.2d at 109; Willistown, 341 A.2d at 468.  
297. BAC, Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 633 A.2d 144, 147 (Pa. 1993). 
298. See Mitchell, supra note 65, at 131 (finding that less expensive housing types in Philadelphia 
metropolitan area were more abundant than in New Jersey municipalities); see also Wish & Eisdorfer, 
supra note 73, at 1273, 1301 (discussing their study’s findings that New Jersey’s program has generated 
some low- to moderate-income housing, but noting that some important goals have yet to be 
achieved). 
299. LIOZ, supra note 189, at 42. 
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Alternatively, there should be a good-faith exception for municipalities that 
mistakenly believe that their zoning is constitutional and comports with the fair-
share requirements. Given the vagueness of the fair-share test, which has never 
been quantified by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, municipalities should have 
an opportunity to correct their zoning without being forced to accommodate a 
development that may be ill suited for the location (and is unlikely to result in 
affordable housing). Under current doctrine, a municipality that recognizes the 
constitutional infirmity in its zoning but fails to publicly announce changes 
before a curative amendment is filed is unable to defend itself based on the new 
zoning.300 This approach suggests that Pennsylvania’s anti-exclusionary zoning 
case law and curative amendment procedures are punitive rather than corrective 
and highlights the focus on property rights rather than social justice. 
2. Encourage Municipalities to Enact Inclusionary Zoning Ordinances 
Many cities and several states across the country have adopted inclusionary 
zoning ordinances.301 Such programs generally provide developers with a variety 
of incentives, including density bonuses, relaxation of development 
requirements, or an expedited permit process in return for building affordable 
housing units.302 By enacting such ordinances, municipalities can be progressive 
in providing for affordable housing rather than be in a defensive position against 
curative amendment challenges. Finally, municipalities can craft inclusionary 
zoning ordinances in the way most appropriate to the housing needs of their 
community and in accordance with their planning goals. 
3. Control Sprawl 
Sprawl itself decreases the availability of affordable housing.303 For 
example, single-family homes on large lots may lead to housing segregation by 
property values.304 Municipalities should work together to control sprawl and 
create affordable housing. The “smart growth” movement, a proposed solution 
to sprawl, advocates sustainable development and the furtherance of several 
principles, including environmental protection, economic competitiveness, and 
equity.305 One of the principal goals of smart growth includes the expansion of 
housing choices and housing affordability.306 Similarly, growth management 
distinguishes itself from exclusionary zoning practices by seeking to “preserve 
public goods, improve social equity and minimize adverse impacts of 
 
300. See, e.g., Bd. of Supervisors v. Barness, 382 A.2d 140, 143-44 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) 
(approving definitive relief for developer even though comprehensive plan that cured zoning 
ordinance’s constitutional infirmity was being prepared before developers sued). 
301. For a discussion of inclusionary zoning practices, see generally Porter, supra note 23, Kautz, 
supra note 82, Lerman, supra note 82, and Morgan, supra note 82. 
302. Porter, supra note 23, at 227-28. 
303. Weiss, supra note 61, at 169. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. at 165. 
306. Id. at 167. 
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development while still accommodating new housing and economic growth.”307 
In fact, “[g]rowth management is an attempt to regulate land uses in ways that 
do not result in social exclusion.”308 Additionally, inclusionary zoning can be an 
integral part of smart growth by creating a diverse, integrated community, 
promoting high-density development (which preserves open space and reduces 
traffic), and requiring alliances between the public, private, and nonprofit sectors 
to ensure success.309 By pursuing smart-growth and growth-management policies, 
regions and municipalities can better plan for development and refocus efforts 
on generating affordable housing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is critical for courts, legislatures, and interested citizens to fight zoning 
that is truly exclusionary. Exclusionary zoning has been historically used as a 
technique to keep out “undesirable” residents, including minorities and low-
income families, and therefore requires our vigilance. Similarly, efforts to 
generate affordable housing in both the cities and the suburbs should be lauded 
and expanded. Pennsylvania’s current approach to combating exclusionary 
zoning with the curative amendment process is ineffective and 
counterproductive. By focusing on property rights rather than people and their 
need to live in decent, affordable housing, Pennsylvania’s “fair share” case law 
removes the focus from low- and moderate-income Pennsylvanians and instead 
places power in the hands of developers, who generally do not have a profit 
incentive to build affordable housing. Additionally, curative amendments 
impede municipalities’ ability to plan effectively for development and meet the 
needs of the community. Therefore, the curative amendment process should be 
revised to provide protection to municipalities acting in good faith and to 
remove this tremendous weapon from developers. By implementing inclusionary 
zoning ordinances and pursuing policies of growth management, municipalities 
can focus their efforts on creating affordable housing rather than fighting 
developers. 
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